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Environmental Law
by Travis M. Trimble*
Notable cases decided in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit in 2019 all arose out of disputes that originated under
the Clean Water Act (CWA).1 The Eleventh Circuit held that, in
preparing an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) in connection
with its decision to issue a dredge and fill permit under Section 4042 of
the CWA, the Corps of Engineers (Corps) was not required to consider
potentially negative environmental effects resulting from activity made
possible by the permit where the agency had no authority
independently to regulate the effects.3 The court also held that the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had the discretion to decide
whether to commence withdrawal proceedings as to Alabama's
authority to operate the CWA's National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES)4 permitting program even where the
agency acknowledged that the state had not at all times fully complied
with program requirements.5 The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia, one of several courts in the country taking
up challenges to the EPA's and the Corps' 2015 Rule defining the term
"Waters of the United States" under the CWA, concluded that the Rule
was beyond the scope of the agencies' statutory authority in several
respects, including the agencies' use of the term "interstate waters,"
which had been included in the regulatory definition of the term since
1978.6 Finally, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia concluded that the proper mechanism for a
* Instructor, University of Georgia School of Law. Mercer University (B.A. 1986);
University of North Carolina (M.A. 1988); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D.
1993). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1388 (2012).
2. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012).
3. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U. S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 941 F.3d 1288, 1296
(11th Cir. 2019).
4. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012).
5. Riverkeeper v. U.S. EPA, 938 F.3d. 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2019).
6. Georgia v. Wheeler, 418 F. Supp. 3d 1336, 1343-44 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 21, 2019).
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defendant to challenge the sufficiency of the 60-day ante litem notice
under the CWA's citizen-suit provision was a motion to dismiss for
insufficiency of process under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(4),7
and that the plaintiffs' failure in the notice to reference the specific
statutory provision of the CWA which the plaintiffs claimed the
defendants violated did not make the notice deficient so as to justify
dismissal of the plaintiffs' claim.8
In Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers,9 a case addressing the scope of environmental impacts of the
Corps' permitting decision the agency was required to consider in
preparing an EIS for the permitting decision, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that under the "rule of reason" as applied by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Department of Transportation v. Public
Citizen,10 the Corps was not required to consider any negative
environmental impacts of its decision over which it did not have
regulatory authority." Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit held that the
Corps did not act arbitrarily and capriciously when it did not consider
the environmental impact of phosphogypsum, a waste byproduct of
fertilizer manufacturing, when it prepared an EIS for, and then
approved, a CWA § 404 permit allowing the fertilizer manufacturer to
discharge dredged or fill material into jurisdictional waters in
connection with its proposed phosphate mining operations in Florida.12
The permittee, Mosaic Fertilizer, mines phosphate in Florida for the
manufacture of fertilizer. In the mining operation, Mosaic excavates
sand, clay, and phosphate ore from the earth. In the manufacturing
operation, the phosphate ore is separated and then processed into
phosphoric acid used to produce fertilizer. A waste byproduct of the
manufacturing process is phosphogypsum, which is radioactive. The
production of one ton of phosphoric acid from ore produces five tons of
waste phosphogypsum. Mosaic's operations produce over thirty million
tons of phosphogypsum per year. Because of radioactive uranium and
other hazardous metals in the phosphogypsum, it must be allowed to
"weather" in open-air stacks that are hundreds of acres wide and
hundreds of feet tall.13
7. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4).
8. Boring v. Pattillo Indus., - F. Supp. 3d _, 2019 LEXIS 216372, at *5-6 (N.D.
Ga. Dec. 11, 2019).
9. 941 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2019).
10. 541 U.S. 752 (2004).
11. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 941 F.3d at 1296.
12. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 941 F.3d at 1301.
13. Id. at 1293-94.
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In an area in central Florida known as "Bone Valley," where Mosaic's
mining and manufacturing operations are located, over a billion tons of
phosphogypsum are stored in stacks. To dispose of the phosphogypsum,
Mosaic pumps a mixture of phosphogypsum and water into reservoirs
on top of the stacks to allow it to dry into a crust. This phosphogypsum-
containing wastewater has on occasion spilled from the stacks,
contaminating rivers, creeks, wetlands, and aquifers.1 4
Mosaic sought to extend its phosphate mining operations in central
Florida. To do so, it needed a permit from the State of Florida allowing
it to mine phosphate, and it also needed, and applied for, a § 404 permit
from the Corps allowing it to discharge dredged and fill material into
waters of the United States in connection with the mining.15 In
compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),16 the
Corps prepared an EIS.17 In the EIS, the Corps considered "[D]irect
effects, such as how the discharge of... material into surrounding
wetlands might affect the water quality of those wetlands," and
"indirect effects, such as how that discharge might through stormwater
runoff be carried to and affect the quality of distant waters."1 8 However,
"The Corps determined that the environmental effects of
phosphogypsum production and storage fell outside the scope of its
NEPA- [mandated] review."19
The plaintiff, Bio-Diversity, filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida, challenging the sufficiency of
the EIS under NEPA, among other things. Bio-Diversity contended that
the Corps' failure to consider the effects of phosphogypsum as an
indirect result of its issuing the 404 permit was arbitrary and
capricious.20 The district court granted summary judgment to the Corps
on Bio-Diversity's NEPA claim, and Bio-Diversity appealed.21
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.22 The court noted that under NEPA, a
federal agency considering a "major federal action" must produce an
EIS that takes into account the "direct, indirect, and cumulative effects"
of the action.23 Indirect effects are those "[C]aused by the action and are
14. Id. at 1306-07 (Martin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
15. Id. at 1292 (majority).
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370m-12 (2012).
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
18. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 941 F.3d at 1293.
19. Id. at 1294.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1306.
23. Id. at 1293.
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later in time or farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably
foreseeable" as a result of the agency's action.24
The court first noted that the causal connection between the permit
allowing for phosphate mining from four of Mosaic's mines and harm
caused by runoff from Mosaic's phosphogymsum stacks is tenuous:
"[P]hosphogypsum is a byproduct not of dredging and filling-nor even
of phosphate mining or beneficiation-but of fertilizer production."25
But the court relied more heavily on two other bases for its holding,
either or both of which seemingly would excuse the Corps from
considering the adverse effects of phosphogypsm in its permitting
decision.26 First, the court pointed to the Supreme Court's "rule of
reason" analysis in Public Citizen: "[Wihere an agency has no ability to
prevent a certain effect due to its limited statutory authority over the
relevant actions, the agency cannot be considered a legally relevant
'cause' of the effect."27 The court noted that, "The Corps has no ability
categorically to prevent fertilizer production or the creation and storage
of phosphogypsum."28 Since the Corps' jurisdiction did not include
phosphogypsum, as a matter of law, phosphogypsum could not be an
effect of the Corps' § 404 permitting decision.29 Second, while, "[T]he
Corps could in fact mitigate the effects of phosphogypsum by rejecting
the . . . permit and choking off Mosaic's supply of phosphate ore ... the
Corps is not statutorily authorized to base its permitting decision on ...
effects that are so indirectly caused by its action."30 The court explained
that the Corps' authority to deny a permit under § 404 is limited to
those situations where the discharge of dredged or fill material alone
would "have an unacceptable adverse effect" on specified environmental
receptors.31 In other words, for either reason, the Corps is obligated to
consider only the effects, including indirect effects, of the discharge of
dredged or fill material into waters, and not the effects of the
permittee's project, which but for the issuance of the permit would not
be possible.32
Since the Corps did not have the authority to regulate Mosaic's
production and storage of phosphogypsum, and since it did not have the
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1295.
26. Id. at 1292.
27. Id. at 1296 (citing Public Citizen, 541 U.S. at 767).







authority to deny Mosaic's § 404 permit based on the effects of
phosphogypsum on the environment, it followed that information
regarding those effects would not be useful to the Corps in making its
permitting decision, and therefore did not need to be included in the
EIS.33
In Cahaba Riverkeeper v. United States Environmental Protection
Agency,34 in an issue of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit, the
Eleventh Circuit held that the EPA has discretion whether to begin
proceedings to withdraw a state's authority to administer the CWA's
NPDES permit program.35 Further, the EPA did not abuse its discretion
in deciding not to move to withdraw Alabama's authority to administer
the NPDES program despite finding that Alabama had not always
administered the program in compliance with the CWA.36
The petitioners, seven environmental groups that advocated for
different river systems in Alabama, had petitioned the EPA to begin
proceedings to withdraw Alabama's authority to administer the NPDES
program. The petitioners initially identified twenty-six grounds for
withdrawal. The EPA issued a final decision declining to begin
withdrawal proceedings, and the petitioners appealed on four
grounds-specific deficiencies in Alabama's administration of the
program-that petitioners claimed warranted withdrawal of Alabama's
authority. First, petitioners claimed that Alabama's public notices of
pending NPDES permitting decisions violated NPDES regulations
because the notices, which must be published in a newspaper in the
area affected by the decision, do not give a general description of the
location of existing or proposed pollutant discharge points, as they are
required to do,37 but instead refer readers to a government website that
provides the locations.38 Second, the petitioners challenged Alabama's
policy of allowing NPDES board members who had conflicts, defined as
receiving significant income from a permit applicant, to recuse
themselves from the permitting decision, rather than disqualifying the
member from membership on the board.39 Third, the petitioners
claimed that by regulation Alabama is required to inspect annually all
permittees designated as "major dischargers," and that Alabama does
33. Id.
34. 938 F.3d 1157 (11th Cir. 2019).
35. Id. at 1165.
36. Id. at 1160.
37. 40 C.F.R. § 124.10(d)(viii).
38. Cahaba Riverkeeper, 938 F.3d at 1167.
39. Id. at 1168.
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not do so.4 0 Fourth, petitioners argued that Alabama could not enforce a
regulation requiring it to be able to sue to recover civil penalties for
permit violations as to state agencies because those agencies are
protected from lawsuits by sovereign immunity, which the Alabama
Constitution prohibits the agencies from waiving.4 1
The petitioners argued that based on these alleged violations of
NPDES regulations by Alabama, the EPA was compelled to begin
withdrawal proceedings, and that its decision not to do so was arbitrary
and capricious.42
The EPA's authority to withdraw a state's authority to administer a
program under the CWA is governed by 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3):43
Whenever the Administrator determines after public hearing that a
State is not administering a program approved under this section in
accordance with the requirements of this section, he shall so notify
the State and, if appropriate corrective action is not taken within a
reasonable time .. . the Administrator shall withdraw approval of
any such program . .. 44
The court noted that this language contains "[B]oth a discretionary
and a nondiscretionary coiponent."4 5 The word "shall" creates a
nondiscretionary duty on the part of the EPA to withdraw state permit
authority on the occurrence of certain conditions, but on the other hand,
the provision requires the EPA to "make a judgment" as to whether the
state is not administering the program according to the CWA.46 The
court found further support for the discretionary aspect of the EPA's
decision in 40 C.F.R. § 123.64(b)(1)47: the EPA "[M]ay order the
commencement of withdrawal proceedings" on its own or in response to
a petition alleging the state's failure to comply with the CWA, and it
"[M]ay conduct an informal investigation of the allegations in [a
petition to commence withdrawal proceedings] to determine whether
cause exists to commence proceedings . . . .
40. Id. at 1169. The regulation at issue, 40 C.F.R. § 123.26(e)(5), states that "State
NPDES compliance evaluation programs shall have procedures and ability for ...
inspecting the facilities of all major dischargers at least annually."
41. Cahaba Riverkeeper, 938 F.3d at 1169.
42. Id. at 1161.
43. 33 U.S.C § 1342(c)(3) (2020).
44. Id. at 1165 (emphasis added) (quoting 33 U.S.C § 1342(c)(3)).
45. Id. (quoting Sierra Club v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2008)).
46. Cahaba Riverkeeper, 938 F.3d at 1165 (quoting Johnson, 541 F.3d at 1265-66).
47. 40 C.F.R. § 123.64(b)(1) (1998).
48. Cahaba Riverkeeper, 938 F.3d at 1166 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 123.64(b)(1)).
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The court held that the EPA had the discretion to decide whether to
commence withdrawal proceedings.4 9 And although the court
acknowledged that the EPA's discretion "is not boundless," the EPA is
entitled to deference from the court to determine what "cause" to
commence proceedings means under the regulation.50
Under this deferential standard, the court concluded that the EPA's
decision not to commence withdrawal proceedings against Alabama was
not arbitrary and capricious.5 1 First, as to the public notice
requirement, the EPA determined that the appropriate action was to
encourage Alabama to include more specific information in its
published notices.52 The court held that this choice was within the
EPA's permissible discretion and was not arbitrary and capricious.53 As
to board members' conflicts, the EPA had adopted a regulation defining
the term "board or body" that "clearly allowed for Alabama's recusal
policy," and since the CWA did not define "board or body" for conflict
purposes, the court held that the EPA's regulation was a reasonable
interpretation of the statutory language and entitled to deference.54
Therefore, its decision to allow Alabama's recusal policy was not
arbitrary and capricious.5 5 With regard to Alabama's failure to do
annual inspections, the EPA adopted a policy recommending
inspections once every two years.56 The court noted that the regulation
governing inspections required states to have "procedures and ability"
to conduct annual inspections but did not actually require annual
inspections.5 7 As such, the EPA's recommendation was not arbitrary,
nor was its decision to commence withdrawal proceedings against
Alabama for not doing so.5 8 Finally, with regard to the petitioners'
charge that Alabama could not sue agencies of the state to recover civil
penalties, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 123.27(a)(3)(i),5 9 because the
agencies had sovereign immunity under the state constitution, the court
accepted the EPA's position that nothing in the CWA or regulations
required states to waive sovereign immunity, and further that a conflict
49. Id. at 1165-66.
50. Id. at 1166.
51. Id. at 1168-70.
52. Id. at 1167-68.
53. Id. at 1168.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1168-69.
56. Id. at 1169.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 40 C.F.R. § 123.27(a)(3)(i) (1993).
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between a federal statutory scheme and a state's sovereign immunity
was a conflict that the EPA could not be expected to resolve in any
event.60 The EPA's decision not to commence withdrawal proceedings on
this ground was not arbitrary and capricious.61
In Georgia v. Wheeler,62 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia again took up the case of the Waters of the
United States (WOTUS) Rule (WOTUS Rule or Rule), promulgated by
the EPA and the Corps of Engineers (the Agencies) in 2015 to define the
term "waters of the United States" in the Clean Water Act. 63 The court
concluded that the Agencies exceeded their statutory authority under
the CWA in promulgating the Rule.6 4 Significantly, as part of this part
of its decision, the court ruled that the Agencies' pre-2015 definition of
Waters of the United States, which had been in place since 1978,65 also
exceeded the Agencies' statutory authority.66 Finally, the court
concluded that the Agencies violated the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) in promulgating the Rule.67 Overall, the thrust of the court's
opinion is that any rule developed by the Agencies to define the term
"waters of the United States" in the CWA must ultimately conform to
Justice Kennedy's "significant-nexus" test set out in Rapanos v. United
States68 for including nonnavigable-in-fact waters within the
definition.6 9
Many of CWA's substantive provisions apply to "navigable waters,"
which the CWA in turn defines as "waters of the United States." 70 As a
result, the Agencies' jurisdiction under much of the CWA is co-extensive
with the definition of "waters of the United States."7 1 The term was
originally defined by regulation in 1978,72 and the proper scope of the
definition had been the subject of much litigation in subsequent years,
60. Cahaba Riverkeeper, 938 F.3d at 1169.
61. Id. at 1170.
62. 418 F. Supp. 3d 1336 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 21 2019).
63. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2019).
64. Wheeler, 418 F. Supp. 3d at 1351.
65. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2019).
66. Wheeler, 418 F. Supp. 3d at 1351.
67. Id. at 1372.
68. 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
69. Wheeler, 418 F. Supp. 3d at 1381.
70. Id. at 1344.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1356.
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including three cases at the Supreme Court.73 The Agencies
promulgated the WOTUS Rule in 2015 to "[P]rovide simpler, clearer,
and more consistent approaches for identifying the geographic scope of
the [CWA] ."74 The Rule incorporated the existing definition of waters of
the United States, including the categories encompassing waters used
in interstate or foreign commerce, "interstate waters" including
"interstate wetlands," and territorial seas (collectively, primary waters)
and added three additional categories: tributaries of primary waters,
waters adjacent to primary waters, and waters determined on a case-
by-case basis to have a "significant nexus" to a primary water.75
Georgia and ten other states76 challenged the Rule on the grounds
that by promulgating the Rule, the Agencies exceeded their authority
under the CWA, violated the APA, and violated the Constitution.77
The court first considered the appropriate standard of review of the
plaintiffs' CWA claim.7 8 The court determined that the plaintiffs' CWA
challenge was to the Agencies' authority under the CWA to interpret
the statutory term "waters of the United States."7 9 Noting that a court
reviewing an agency's interpretation of its authority under a statute
generally must apply the Chevron deference standard80 to the agency's
interpretation, the court nevertheless concluded that it was not
required to defer to the Agencies as to whether they exceeded their
statutory authority in defining "waters of the United States," and
further, the Agencies' authority to define the term was itself limited by
the holding of the Supreme Court in Rapanos.81 Finally, because the
Eleventh Circuit had adopted Justice Kennedy's "significant nexus" test
as the governing rule of Rapanos, the Agencies' statutory authority to
73. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001);
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). See Wheeler, 418 F. Supp. 3d at 1344.
74. Wheeler, 418 F. Supp. 3d at 1344 (citing Definition of "Waters of the United
States," 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 37,057 (June 29, 2015).
75. Id. at 1345.
76. West Virginia, Alabama, Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, South Carolina, Utah,
Wisconsin, North Carolina, and Indiana.
77. Wheeler, 418 F. Supp. 3d at 1344-45.
78. Id. at 1348.
79. Id. at 1348-49.
80. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984). Under the Chevron deference standard, a court must first determine if the
statutory language at issue is unambiguous. If so, then the Legislature's intent as
expressed in the language controls the court's decision. If the court concludes that the
statutory language is ambiguous or silent on the issue, then the court must decide if the
agency's interpretation is based on a permissible construction of the statutory language.
81. Wheeler, 418 F. Supp. 3d at 1345.
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define the term "waters of the United States" was limited by the
significant-nexus test.82 The Court expressed the test as follows: a
water can be considered "navigable" under the CWA only if it possesses
a significant nexus to waters that are or were navigable in fact or could
reasonably be so made.83 A nonnavigable-in-fact water possesses a
significant nexus to a navigable-in-fact water when it, "[E]ither alone or
in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly
affect[s] the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered
waters more readily understood as 'navigable."'84
Applying the significant-nexus test as the limit of the Agencies'
authority, the court concluded that the WOTUS Rule exceeded that
authority in several respects.8 5
First, the court concluded that the agency rule defining waters of the
United States to include interstate waters, which dated from 1978,
exceeded the agencies' authority.6 The court explained that while
ordinarily an agency rule could not be challenged after six years from
its promulgation, here, the Agencies had "reopened" the original rule by
incorporating it in the 2015 WOTUS Rule.8 7 As such, it became subject
to the significant-nexus test from Rapanos.88 The court went on to
conclude that "the inclusion of all interstate waters in the definition of
'waters of the United States,"' without regard to navigability, failed the
significant-nexus test because it effectively "reads the term navigability
out of the CWA."89 The court explained that "[u]nder such a broad
definition, a mere trickle, an isolated pond, or some other small, non-
navigable body of water would be under federal jurisdiction simply
because it crosses a state line or lies along a state border."90
Next, the court concluded that two of the three additional (beyond
those in the original rule) categories of waters the Agencies had
included in the Rule exceeded the Agencies' authority to interpret the
CWA because they did not pass the significant-nexus test.91 The Rule
defined the first category to be included, tributaries of primary waters,
as those characterized by the physical indicators of a bed and banks and
82. Id. at 1355 (citing See, United States v. Robinson, 505 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2007)).
83. Id. at 1353.
84. Id. at 1352 (citing Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780).
85. See generally, Wheeler, 418 F. Supp. 3d 1336.
86. Id. at 1355-66.
87. Id. at 1355-58.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1358.
90. Id. at 1359.
91. See generally, id. at 1360-69.
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an ordinary high water mark (OHWM).92 So far so good. However, the
Rule also allowed the presence of a bed and banks and an OHWM to be
determined using "computer-based models, historical data, and
mapping technology."9 3  The court found that standard to be
impermissibly broad:
[O]n one hand, the Agencies rely on these physical indicators as
evidence of a significant nexus . . . but on the other, they say that
these indicators need not be physically, or currently, present in a
certain location so long as they can be found to exist or to have
previously existed using computer technology, statistics, and
historical data.94
This standard "[S]eems to leave wide room for regulation of drains,
ditches, and streams remote from any navigable-in-fact water . . . ."95
The court also found fault with the applicability of the physical
indicators test in the "Arid West," where the court noted that the
presence of an OHWM was frequently due to isolated, extreme flooding
events and did not demonstrate a regular flow sufficient to show a
significant nexus between a nonnavigable and navigable waterway.96
The court also concluded that the second category, waters adjacent to
primary waters, did not pass muster under the significant-nexus test.97
The definition of waters adjacent to primary waters included waters
adjacent to tributaries of primary waters, waters within 100 feet of a
primary water, and waters within the 100-year floodplain of any
primary water, impoundment or tributary, and not more than 1,500 feet
from the OHWM of any of those bodies of water.9 8 The court accepted
the 100-foot category of adjacent waters as having a significant nexus to
a navigable-in-fact water, but rejected the 100-year floodplain
category.9 9 The court explained that nothing in the Rule showed why
waters within the 100-year floodplain of a primary water or tributary
would necessarily have a significant nexus to the primary water. 100
The court did allow to stand the category of waters that came within
the 100-year floodplain of a primary water or within 4,000 feet of a high
92. Id. at 1360.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1361.
95. Id. (citing Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 778).
96. Id. at 1362.
97. Id. at 1363-67.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1365-67.
100. Id.
1016 MERCER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
tide line and which also were determined on a case-by-case basis to
have a "significant nexus" to a primary water, where "significant nexus"
was defined in the Rule in a way that was consistent with Justice
Kennedy's definition in Rapanos.10 1 However, the court excluded from
acceptable waters in this category the use of "interstate waters" or
"tributaries" as a type of primary water, because the court had
concluded that the use of these categories in the Rule exceeded the
Agencies' authority under the CWA as limited by Rapanos.102
The court also concluded that the Agencies exceeded their authority
under the CWA with WOTUS Rule in another way: because the Rule
expanded the jurisdiction of the Agencies by from 2.84 to 4.65 percent,
the Rule constituted a "[S]ubstantial intrusion into lands and waters
traditionally left to state authority."103 The court noted that the CWA
stated the intent of Congress to recognize and protect "[T]he primary
responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate
pollution and to plan the development and use .. . of land and water
resources."10 4 The court concluded that "an almost two-percent increase
in jurisdiction nationwide is a substantial intrusion into lands and
waters traditionally left to state authority," and for this reason too, "the
WOTUS Rule is unlawful under the CWA."105
The court also concluded that the Rule violated the Administrative
Procedure Act in two ways.106 First, "[T]he Final Rule was not the
logical outgrowth of the Proposed Rule," because the Proposed Rule did
not contain the specific distance limits defining the "adjacent waters"
category or the farming exemption for adjacent waters (but not
tributaries), and the plaintiffs were not able to foresee those limits or
exemptions potentially being in the Final Rule and thus were unable to
comment on them during the rulemaking process. 107 Second, portions of
the Rule were arbitrary and capricious, because the Rule (1) exempted
adjacent waters on farmland but not tributaries on farmland, and (2)
set distance limits for including "adjacent waters" without providing a
rational basis for doing so.
10 8
101. Id. at 1367-69.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1371.
104. Id. at 1370.
105. Id. at 1371-72.
106. Id. at 1372.
107. Id. at 1372-78.
108. Id. at 1379-1381.
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In Boring v. Pattillo Industrial Real Estate,109 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia decided that the
proper mechanism to challenge the sufficiency of ante litem notice
under the CWA's citizen-suit provision110 is Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4), a
challenge to the sufficiency of process, and not 12(b)(1),111 dismissal for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.112 The court also concluded that
plaintiffs' notice letter met the regulatory requirements for notice
despite not identifying the specific statutory provision the plaintiffs
contended the defendants had violated. 113
The defendants were developers engaged in construction activities in
an industrial park in Jackson County, Georgia. The plaintiffs,
downstream residents and landowners, sued defendants, alleging that
silt and other runoff from the defendants' construction site damaged
dams, ponds, roads and properties in violation of the CWA.114 The
plaintiffs sent the defendants a pre-suit notice letter sixty days before
filing suit, as required by the CWA.115 The notice letter claimed the
defendants' construction activities violated the CWA because they were
"[W]ithout valid coverage under a ... (NPDES) Permit," and failed "to
comply with the terms and conditions of NPDES Construction
Stormwater General Permits GAR100001 and GAR10003."116 The letter
identified damages associated with the runoff.117 Subsequently, the
plaintiffs filed suit under § 402118 and § 301119of CWA. 120
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' suit for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). 121 The
defendants claimed that the plaintiffs' pre-suit notice letter did not
comply with the regulatory requirements for notice prior to a citizen-
109. _ F.Supp. 3d. -, 2019 LEXIS 216372.
110. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1) (2018).
111. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
112. Boring, 2019 LEXIS 216372, at *4-6.
113. Id. at *7-16.
114. Id. at *12.
115. Id. at *2.
116. Id. at *12.
117. Id. at *12-13.
118. 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
119. § 301 of the CWA (33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1995)) provides in relevant part that "the
discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful" unless done so in compliance
with a permit issued under § 402.
120. See, Boring, 2019 LEXIS 216372, at *4.
121. Id. at *4-5.
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suit because it did not reference a particular statutory standard that
the plaintiffs claimed the defendants were violating.122
The court first concluded that a 12(b)(1) motion was not the proper
mechanism to challenge the sufficiency of pre-suit notice under the
CWA.123 Rather, the court concluded that the most analogous defense
was insufficiency of process under 12(b)(4).124 The court noted that
unlike subject matter jurisdiction, insufficient pre-suit notice could not
be challenged at any point during the litigation.125 Furthermore, pre-
suit notice, like process, relates to the type of notice of a lawsuit a
defendant must receive.126 Finally, pre-suit notice concerned the rights
of the parties, not the power of the court to hear the case.127
Accordingly, the court concluded that the defendants' motion must
comply with Rule 12(b)(4), meaning that a failure to challenge the
sufficiency of notice in one of the ways set out in Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)
would constitute waiver of the defense.128 The court also concluded that
the plaintiffs would bear the burden of proving the sufficiency of
notice.129
The court went on to consider the defendants' claim that the notice
was deficient because it did not reference a specific statutory section on
its meritS.130 The contents of a pre-suit notice under the CWA are
governed by regulation, which requires that the notice "[I]nclude
sufficient information to permit the recipient to identify" the standard
the plaintiff claims the recipient has violated.131 The court noted that
the regulation "does not require a plaintiff to identify the specific
standard," and even though the court was required to strictly construe
the regulation's language, the court refused to "[R]ead into the text a
requirement that does not exist there."132 As a result, the court "[H]olds
that failure to cite to the specific statutory provisions does not render
Plaintiffs' Notice categorically deficient" under the regulation.133
The court also concluded that the plaintiffs' notice did meet the
regulatory requirement of "sufficient information" to allow the
122. Id. at *6-7.
123. Id. at *4-5.




128. Id. at *6.
129. Id.
130. Id. at *7-12.
131. Id. at *7 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 135.3(a) (1973)).
132. Id.
133. Id. at *11-12.
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defendants to identify the basis for the plaintiffs' claim.134 The court
noted that the notice referenced NPDES permits, which "[C]an only be
referring to the permitting statute § 402 and the associated violation
under § 301, the statutes that were in fact the basis for the CWA claim
in the Complaint." 35
134. Id. at *12-14.
135. Id. at *13.
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